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Abstract
Introduction Intravenous medication administration is widely reported to be error prone. Technologies such as smart pumps 
have been introduced with a view to reducing these errors. An international comparison could provide evidence of their 
effectiveness, including consideration of contextual factors such as regulatory systems and local cultures.
Objectives The aim of this study was to investigate similarities and differences in practices and error types involving intra-
venous medication administration in the United States and England, and summarise methodological differences necessary 
to perform these parallel studies.
Methods We drew on findings of separate point prevalence studies conducted across hospitals in each country. In these, we 
compared what was being administered at the time of observation with the prescription and relevant policies, errors were 
classified by type and severity, and proportions of infusions featuring each error type were calculated. We also reviewed 
what adaptations to the US protocol were needed for England. Authors independently reviewed findings from both studies 
and proposed themes for comparison. In online meetings, each country’s research team clarified assumptions and explained 
their findings.
Results Key themes included commonalities and contrasts in methods, findings, practices and policies. Although US sites 
made greater use of smart infusion devices, and had more precisely defined requirements around infusion device use, pat-
terns of errors were similar. Differences among clinical contexts within each country were as marked as differences across 
countries. Regulatory and quality control systems shape practices, but causal relationships are complex.
Conclusion Infusion administration is a complex adaptive system with multiple interacting agents (professionals, patients, 
software systems, etc.) that respond in rich ways to their environments; safety depends on complex, interrelated factors.
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Key Points 
This study synthesises data from two multi-centre stud-
ies in different countries that adopted similar methods 
totalling 3172 observations of intravenous medication 
administrations.
Given differences in the adoption of advanced technolo-
gies such as smart pumps, error rates and severities are 
surprisingly similar, with some differences in error types.
The findings are consistent with viewing intravenous 
medication as a complex adaptive system, in which 
interventions do not have a simple deterministic effect, 
but locally appropriate interventions can improve patient 
safety.
1 Introduction
Intravenous medication administration practices involving 
infusion devices have been identified as a source of errors, 
potentially compromising patient safety [1]. The practice of 
using smart infusion devices, where the device is integrated 
with information systems and drug libraries to set safe limits 
on medication administration, has been advocated to block 
critical medication administration errors [2–4].
In a systematic review, Keers et al. [5] note wide vari-
ations in definitions of a medication administration error, 
contexts in which they have been studied, and methods 
used to measure error rates. Hertzel and Souza [6] also note 
wide variation in methods across studies of smart infusion 
devices, with some reporting a positive effect in reducing 
errors and others no effect. They highlight the importance of 
staff training and full implementation of smart features for 
reducing errors, noting that the main source of errors is staff 
overriding smart features. They conclude that smart infu-
sion devices “could prevent medication errors and save lives 
when properly configured and used”. Ohashi et al. [7] make 
similar points; they highlight opportunities for improvement 
including standardising and maintaining drug libraries, and 
enforcing hard limits to minimise workarounds. Reporting 
on smart infusion device implementation in one hospital, 
Keohane et al. [8] highlight the importance of creating a cul-
ture in which staff value their own competence and patient 
safety, and in which technology is easy to use correctly and 
implementation is viewed as a process of continual upgrade. 
Schnock et al. [9] introduced an infusion safety intervention 
bundle in nine United States (US) hospitals comprising eight 
interventions to address areas of medication labelling and 
tube tagging, administration of unauthorised medications 
and smart infusion device use. Different components of the 
bundle were adopted and adapted by different hospitals, and 
local contextual factors influenced uptake and effectiveness 
of the interventions. Changes in error rates were statistically 
significant in some cases, but not in most.
Most studies of the role of infusion devices in ensuring 
safe medication administration practices have taken place 
in the US [10, 11]. Fewer have taken place in the UK [12, 
13]. Cousins et al. [14] conducted an audit across six hospi-
tals in three different countries in Europe (England, France 
and Germany) and highlighted uncontrolled risks but did 
not conduct an explicit comparison among countries. Wirtz 
and Barber [15] conducted a comparative study across three 
large teaching hospitals in the UK and Germany with differ-
ent drug supply and pharmacy services, applying an obser-
vational method to count and classify errors; the focus was 
on the effects of different kinds of service on error rates and 
types rather than the country in which observations took 
place. Dean et al. [16] compared non-intravenous medica-
tion administration errors between the US and England. No 
previous study has compared intravenous medication admin-
istration practices and errors between the US and England. 
Smart infusion devices have been widely implemented in 
the US [17]. Take-up in England has been patchy, and even 
where smart devices have been introduced, drug libraries 
may only be partially implemented [18].
Our aim was to better understand differences in practices 
and errors around intravenous medication administration in 
the US and England, based on our experiences in conducting 
parallel studies in each country.
2  Method
We conducted a comparative analysis of parallel stud-
ies from the US and England [11, 13]. The methods are 
presented in detail elsewhere [11, 19]. In brief, each study 
recruited a number of hospitals, selected to provide gener-
alisable findings. Within each hospital, data were collected 
on intravenous medication administration across three to 
five clinical areas (Table 1). Data were collected in each 
area over approximately a day; this typically resulted in data 
on 30–40 administrations per area in each hospital. Data 
collection involved two trained observers (typically a nurse 
and a pharmacist from that hospital) visiting each clinical 
area, checking every intravenous medication being admin-
istered or scheduled to be administered at the time of their 
visit, comparing details of what was being administered 
and its documentation with the medication order and rel-
evant national and local policy, and entering these data into 
a REDCap database [20]. The observers worked together 
to validate each other’s work and to agree on error type(s), 
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as listed in Table 2, and a severity rating for every error 
observed, based on an adapted US National Coordinating 
Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention 
(NCC MERP) Medication Error index (Table 3). All data 
were checked and cleaned where needed. The original NCC 
MERP index [21, 22] classifies errors according to their 
outcomes, so the main adaptation (across both countries) 
was that the consequences of errors had to be anticipated, 
since errors were corrected where possible at the point of 
observation (see [19] for details).  
A further adaptation for the England study was that 
the least severe deviations (category A) were classified as 
Table 1  Planned differences in methodology
BCMA barcode medication administration, CPOE computerised physician order entry, EHR electronic health records, ICU intensive care unit, 
PCA patient-controlled analgesia
Theme United States England
Number and types of hospitals 10, representing variation in device vendors, geo-
graphical location and hospital types. All used smart 
infusion devices and EHR; most also used CPOE 
and BCMA
16, representing variation in technological maturity, 
geographical location and care quality (as reported 
by the English Care Quality Commission). Hospitals 
using smart infusion devices were prioritised since 
these are relatively uncommon in England. None used 
BCMA. Use of CPOE and EHRs was variable (often 
within only a few clinical areas)
Infusion device types All were smart infusion devices (from three different 
vendors)
Smart infusion devices, traditional infusion devices, 
gravity feed
Clinical areas General medical
General surgical
Medical ICU
Surgical ICU
General medical
General surgical
General ICU
Paediatrics (across some participating general hospitals 
and additional specialist hospitals)
Oncology day care (across some participating general 
hospitals and additional specialist hospitals)
Infusions included All intravenous infusion including PCA. Blood prod-
ucts and parenteral nutrition were excluded
All intravenous infusions, including PCA, blood and 
parenteral nutrition
Table 2  Errors as percentage of infusions observed across contexts and infusion device types
NA not applicable
Error type United States England total England
smart
England
traditional
England
gravity
Number of infusions observed n = 1164 n = 2008 n = 640 n = 1205 n = 163
Documentation of the order or administration NA 18.5 6.2 16.1 17.8
Label not completed according to policy 60.1 10.9 43.1 9.6 14.7
Tubing not tagged according to policy 35.0 26.7 38.9 16.9 43.6
Unauthorised medication 24.1 3.8 4.1 4.0 1.2
Smart infusion device or drug library not used 10.3 3.3 10.5 NA NA
Wrong rate 4.6 7.6 6.9 6.7 16.6
Omission of intravenous medications/fluids 4.6 0.6 0.2 0.7 1.8
Expired drug 2.1 0.6 0.3 0.9 0.0
Wrong dose 2.0 0.9 0.9 1.1 0.0
Delay in administration 1.2 2.6 2.2 2.4 5.5
Infusion device setting error 0.5 0.0 NA NA NA
Wrong fluid/medication 0.3 0.6 0.8 0.6 0.6
Wrong concentration 0.3 0.5 0.2 0.7 0.6
Patient identification error 0.2 5.8 2.7 7.6 4.9
Allergy oversight 0.1 0.1 0.0 0.1 0.6
Incomplete or delayed completion NA 2.0 0.6 2.6 3.7
Roller clamp positioned incorrectly 0.0 0.5 0.2 0.3 3.7
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discrepancies rather than errors and further subdivided into 
A1 and A2 to provide a more fine-grained account of devia-
tions from protocol. This was done in response to prelimi-
nary discussions with clinicians at participating sites who 
regarded such deviations as normal practice: many were 
workarounds that contributed to, rather than undermined, 
patient safety (although the factors that provoked the worka-
rounds might compromise patient safety at a larger scale). 
In the US, these were classed as errors, reflecting US Joint 
Commission definitions [23]. For comparative purposes in 
the analyses reported here, all are considered errors.
The primary analysis in each national study focused on 
the proportions of errors of different types and severities, 
across different clinical settings and (in England) for differ-
ent modes of administration (gravity, or through a traditional 
or smart pump).
The US study was conducted in 2013–2014 and the Eng-
land study in 2015–2016. The England study used the same 
methods for data collection and analysis wherever possi-
ble, with adaptations as summarised in Table 1. The US 
study had set out to recruit sites that used smart infusion 
pumps whereas the England study (where such pumps are 
not widely used) recruited sites that used both smart and 
traditional pumps (and gravity feed was also used at sev-
eral participating sites). There were also differences in the 
clinical areas observed, because it is not common practice 
in England to separate medical and surgical ICUs and the 
funders of the England study stipulated that paediatrics and 
oncology day care should be studied (as areas that make 
extensive use of infusion pumps, and where errors might 
have particularly severe consequences).
Once the separate studies had been completed, members 
of both study teams convened to identify themes for com-
parison across the two studies. Initially, the well-sorted tool 
(https ://www.well-sorte d.org/) was used to enable all authors 
to individually identify and collectively agree key themes, 
which were then honed through rounds of discussion. We 
conducted comparative analyses of data from both stud-
ies, including the prevalence and types of errors, to better 
understand factors likely to be related to differences across 
countries, levels of technological maturity, or other factors.
3  Results
We present the results of this comparative study under three 
themes: commonalities and differences in findings from the 
two study contexts; nuanced differences in methods that 
became apparent through the process of comparing findings; 
and differences in contextual factors that were tacitly known 
prior to the study, but whose significance became apparent 
through discussions.
3.1  Commonalities and Differences in Findings
Table 2 shows a comparison between the US and England 
studies for the different types of error detected.
Documentation errors were not recorded as a separate 
category in the US study: computerised physician order 
entry (CPOE) had been implemented at most US study 
sites, which enforced compliance with most documentation 
requirements. Differences in the data for labels not being 
completed according to policy and tubing not being tagged 
according to policy can largely be accounted for by differ-
ences in policy. There is a more detailed expectation of what 
should be included on labels in the US, as specified by the 
Joint Commission [24], although these guidelines may be 
interpreted differently by different hospitals. In England, 
Table 3  Adapted National Coordinating Council for Medication Error Reporting and Prevention medication error severity index
Harm Category Description
Error (US)
Discrepancy 
(England), no 
harm
United States Circumstances or events that 
have the capacity to cause 
error
A England A1: Discrepancy but no error
A2: Capacity to cause error
Error, no harm B An error occurred but did not reach the patient (only counted in US study, see text)
C An error occurred but is unlikely to cause harm despite reaching the patient
D An error occurred that would be likely to have required increased monitoring and/or intervention to preclude 
harm
Error, harm E An error occurred that would be likely to have caused temporary harm
F An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in temporary harm to the patient and required initial 
or prolonged hospitalisation
G An error occurred that may have contributed to or resulted in permanent patient harm
H An error occurred that required intervention necessary to sustain life
Error, death I An error occurred that would be likely to have contributed to or resulted in the patient’s death
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policies are written locally, so there is more substantial vari-
ation among study sites [25].
Patient identification errors (i.e. omission of a record of 
having identified a patient) were higher in the England study 
than the US study; the main contributory factor is likely to 
be the widespread use of barcode medication administration 
(BCMA) in the US study, which makes it more difficult to 
administer medication without formal identification.
The category of ‘infusion device setting error’ was not 
included in the England study as all errors were encoded by 
the resulting error type rather than their cause, and no errors 
of ‘incomplete or delayed completion’ were recorded in the 
US, as any such errors were classified under another heading 
(e.g. omission or delay).
The majority of errors in each country were classified as 
A–C according to the adapted NCC MERP severity index 
(Table 3). Very few (n = 25; 0.79% of all infusions) were 
classified as D (“an error occurred that would be likely to 
have required increased monitoring and/or intervention to 
preclude harm”). Across all 3172 observations, only two 
(one in the US, one in England) were assessed to be level 
E (“an error occurred that would be likely to have caused 
temporary harm”). None were F (“an error occurred that 
would be likely to have caused temporary harm and pro-
longed hospitalisation”) or higher.
Table 4 summarises the error types for the more serious 
errors (categories D and E). Error types are omitted from 
this table if no errors in these categories were observed. This 
shows that the greatest proportion of category D errors con-
cerned English gravity feed infusions running at the wrong 
rate. The category E errors concerned one delay (US, smart 
infusion device) and one concentration error (England, grav-
ity administration).
Overall, the commonalities across the US and England 
studies are much more striking than the differences, and the 
use of smart infusion devices makes little consistent differ-
ence across contexts.
3.2  Nuanced Differences in Methods
As noted above, the process of comparing findings across 
the study contexts revealed unplanned variations in data col-
lection methods as well as those that were planned. These 
unplanned variations are listed in Table 5.
Some of the variations were incidental and concerned 
minor differences in the ways that the study protocol was 
interpreted. For example, some ‘wrong rate’ errors were 
classified as ‘infusion device setting’ errors by the US team, 
where the infusion device setting caused the wrong rate; 
conversely, the English team recorded roller clamp position-
ing errors (principally with gravity feed), which would have 
been classified by the US team as wrong rate errors.
Some variations were also a consequence of the use of 
different technologies. For example, some kinds of paper 
documentation omissions observed in England were blocked 
by CPOE/BCMA technology in the US, and were therefore 
recorded in the England study but not considered in the US 
study.
3.3  Differences in Contextual Factors
There were some key factors across contexts and legislatures 
that shaped differences in methods and outcomes.
The first was technology implementation. In the US study, 
all sites had implemented electronic health records (EHRs), 
and most BCMA and CPOE, and intravenous infusions were 
routinely scanned before administration. In the England 
study, some sites had implemented EHRs, and some CPOE. 
Few had implemented smart infusion devices with drug 
libraries across all clinical areas; more had implemented 
smart infusion devices in selected areas (most commonly 
critical care); others were using traditional infusion devices 
and gravity feed. The implementation of EHRs and CPOE 
lags behind in England, although it is now progressing rap-
idly [26].
Table 4  Number of errors classified as severity categories D or E (shown as ‘E’) across study contexts and types of infusion devices
United States
smart
England total England
smart
England
traditional
England
gravity
Number of infusions observed 1164 2008 640 1205 163
Label not completed according to policy 1 1
Unauthorised medication 3 2 1
Wrong rate 2 12 1 3 8
Omission of intravenous medications/fluids 1 3 1 2
Expired drug 1 0
Wrong dose 2 1 1
Delay 1 (E) 0
Wrong concentration 1 (E) 1 (E)
Percentage with errors in categories D and E 0.43 1.10 0.78 0.50 6.13
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A second was the use of drug libraries. In the US, vendors 
supply drug library packages, but there is, nevertheless, large 
variation among hospitals [27]. In England, sites that made 
use of a drug library reported having constructed it locally; 
this was typically a pharmacy responsibility.
At a national policy level, in the US, The Joint Commis-
sion guidelines drive policy [28], although they are often 
interpreted differently by different hospitals. In England, the 
Care Quality Commission expects every hospital to have 
relevant policies [29], but does not mandate their content.
Finally, in terms of local prescription policies, in the US, 
fluids might be given without always requiring a repeated 
medication order (as long as there is an original order for 
that fluid), and keep vein open (KVO) administrations may 
run without a medication order (according to a standing 
hospital policy); verbal orders are discouraged by The Joint 
Commission but are sometimes used. In England, there is 
variation in local policy about what can be given without 
prescription and KVO practices are rarely reported.
4  Discussion
This combined study draws on the observation of 3172 infu-
sion administrations. As found in the England study alone 
[13], the only clear conclusion is that medication adminis-
tered by gravity feed is more likely to result in patient harm 
than medication administered via infusion devices. A domi-
nant theme across contexts was the variability within and 
between sites, particularly relating to intravenous medication 
administration policy [11, 13].
We found less variability in error rates or types across the 
studies than might have been expected, given the differences 
in the use of smart infusion devices. This suggests that intro-
ducing more sophisticated technology without reviewing the 
policies and practices that surround those technologies does 
not necessarily improve patient safety.
This comparison reinforces the findings reported by 
Furniss et al. that there are many sources of variability in 
practice, and while some of those are essential responses to 
local circumstances, others introduce unnecessary complex-
ity [25]. In the UK, multiple organisations (e.g. the National 
Institute for Health and Care Excellence, the Royal College 
of Nursing, the Royal Pharmaceutical Society) publish 
guidelines and standards for intravenous medication admin-
istration, but these are typically subject to interpretation. 
Although in the US The Joint Commission has published 
more tightly defined standards, those are still interpreted 
in different ways across contexts. One promising area for 
future review is the setting and interpretation of standards 
and policies to ensure that they are fit for purpose and sup-
port safe practices.
Arguably, the levels of safety observed in these studies 
have been achieved through vigilance, system improve-
ments, and the diligence and professionalism of staff. Oth-
ers have discussed CPOE as a complex adaptive system [30, 
31]; we have not identified any previous studies that have 
discussed intravenous infusion administration in these terms; 
however, this comparative study highlights the many sources 
of variability in intravenous infusion administration across 
contexts, and suggests intravenous infusion administration 
is also a complex adaptive system.
The established literature on complex systems in health-
care repeatedly points out the futility of trying to reduce any 
complex adaptive system to a set of independently address-
able problems [32, 33]. Braithwaite et al. [33] argue that, 
despite their apparent potential for chaos, complex adap-
tive systems self-regulate through the actions of people 
who develop structures and routines that create stability and 
acceptable performance within the system. The challenge 
with such systems is to ensure that performance remains 
acceptable over time, and where possible improves, as exter-
nal pressures change.
The introduction of smart infusion devices, standards, 
or the interventions introduced by Schnock et al. [9] are 
not instant solutions to the problem of intravenous infu-
sion administration errors, and may be better considered as 
‘probes’ to better understand what does and does not work 
in a particular context, and what might work well in the 
future [34]. Thus, the question is not whether smart infu-
sion devices are safer than traditional infusion devices, 
whether particular standards are optimal, or whether a par-
ticular intervention will universally lead to safer practices, 
but whether particular configurations of technology, proce-
dures, practices and people are likely to enhance or diminish 
safety. Future technologies and policies need to support staff 
in doing their work effectively. One focus for future research 
should be how to optimise configurations of work system 
elements across sites and clinical areas.
4.1  Limitations
Any international comparison unavoidably introduces con-
founding factors due to differences in culture and practices. 
We aimed to minimise the differences in data collection that 
could be attributed to the training of the data collectors and 
analysts; however, small differences remain. We have sum-
marised all the differences identified in Tables 1 and 5.
The US study had recruited only sites that had already 
implemented smart pumps across all clinical areas, so we 
have no evidence on the contributions of different pump 
types in the US context.
As noted above, neither the US nor the England study 
identified any events where patient safety was significantly 
compromised; it is more likely that such incidents would 
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feature using a different method that focuses on reports 
of more serious incidents involving medication admin-
istration or potentially the analysis of large numbers of 
infusion device logs. Such a study, including rich causal 
accounts of factors contributing to serious untoward inci-
dents, combined with a systematic risk analysis of ‘low 
frequency but high consequence’ events, might show ben-
efits of more advanced technology solutions.
5  Conclusions
We compared the findings from separate studies in the US 
and England that aimed to mirror each other and identi-
fied both similarities and differences in error rates and 
practices around intravenous infusion administration. 
Considering the different levels of technological maturity 
across the study contexts, the observed error rates are sur-
prisingly similar: there are few serious errors, but several 
errors of some importance, and some differences in the 
potential underlying causes of errors. No one intervention, 
whether related to novel technology, adoption of standards, 
or particular policy changes, has a deterministic effect on 
behaviour or error rates, but together a set of interventions, 
appropriate to local circumstances, can support and guide 
staff to behave as safely and effectively as possible.
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